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Abstract. In quasi-proportional auctions, each bidder receives a fraction of the allocation
equal to the weight of their bid divided by the sum of weights of all bids, where each bid’s
weight is determined by a weight function. We study the relationship between the weight
function, bidders’ private values, number of bidders, and the seller’s revenue in equilibrium.
It has been shown that if one bidder has a much higher private value than the others, then a
nearly flat weight function maximizes revenue. Essentially, threatening the bidder who has
the highest valuation with having to share the allocation maximizes the revenue. We show
that as bidder private values approach parity, steeper weight functions maximize revenue
by making the quasi-proportional auction more like a winner-take-all auction. We also show
that steeper weight functions maximize revenue as the number of bidders increases. For
flatter weight functions, there is known to be a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We
show that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium also exists for steeper weight functions, and we
give lower bounds for bids at an equilibrium. For a special case that includes the two-bidder
auction, we show that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique, and we show how to
compute the revenue at equilibrium. We also show that selecting a weight function based
on private value ratios and number of bidders is necessary for a quasi-proportional auction
to produce more revenue than a second-price auction.
1 Introduction
Quasi-proportional auctions [2, 9] award each bidder a fraction of the total allocation equal to the
weight of their bid divided by the sum of weights of all bids, where a bid’s weight is determined
by a weight function. Hence, the allocation for bidder i is
ai(b) =
f(bi)∑
j f(bj)
, (1)
where b is the vector of bids and f is the weight function. In this paper, we focus on winners-pay
quasi-proportional auctions, in which bidders pay their bid times their allocation. (A well-known
alternative is the all-pay auction, in which all bidders pay their full bid regardless of allocation
[2]. The all-pay auction has been used as a model for disparate interests plying officials with gifts
and favors in hopes of influencing policy.)
Why use quasi-proportional auctions? It is well known that the revenue-optimal auction (for
a single item, non-repeated) is the second-price auction with optimal reserve prices [14, 16]. The
optimal reserve prices are based on knowledge of prior distributions from which bidders draw their
private values. Without this knowledge, we are in a prior-free setting [6, 7], in which it can be a
challenge to set effective reserve prices [13]. If the auction is repeated and priors are stable over
time, then the priors may be learnable [10, 3, 4, 8]. However, in some practical scenarios with
unknown priors, either the auction is not repeated, or the priors change from auction to auction.
In the prior-free setting without reserve prices, Mirrokni et al. [12] show that a quasi-proportional
auction has better worst-case performance than a second-price auction. In their worst case, the
bidder with the highest private value has a much higher private value than the other bidders. In
this case, they show that quasi-proportional auctions with functions f(x) = xp and p ≤ 1, called
Tullock auctions [2], can achieve Ω(
√
α) revenue, where α is the ratio of the highest private value
to the next-highest private value. These results are called prior-free revenue results. Nguyen and
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Vojnovic [15] show that for the prior-free setting without reserve prices, there is an upper bound
of o( v1
log(
v1
v2
)
) on equilibrium revenue, where v1 and v2 are the two highest private values of bidders.
They also give a mechanism that achieves revenue Ω( v1
log1+(
v1
v2
+1)
), which is similar to the best
known prior-free result with reserve prices [11].
Other than a lack of priors, some reasons why a quasi-proportional allocation might be useful
include:
1. The item is always awarded. For auctions with reserve prices, the item may be withheld
from all bidders. This may create a problem for the seller. Quasi-proportional auctions avoid
this problem.
2. There is a shared allocation. The seller may desire a shared allocation if a zero allocation to
runner-up bidders makes them unlikely to participate in future auctions, which can decrease
competition and revenue in those auctions. A shared allocation awards a “second prize for
the second price.” (A single allocation is also possible: the auctioneer can award the item
at random, with each bidder’s probability of winning the item equal to its fraction of the
allocation [13].)
For the winners-pay quasi-proportional auction, assume bidder i has utility function
ui(b) = ai(b)(vi − bi), (2)
where vi is bidder i’s private value for a full allocation. Without loss of generality, in this paper we
assume the weight function f has the form f(x) = xp, where the exponent p > 0 is to be specified.
The main contributions of this paper are:
1. For all p > 0, we show that the quasi-proportional auction with weight function f(x) = xp
has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
2. We give lower bounds for bids at a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The bounds are based
on p and the level of competition, in terms of number of bidders and their private values. As
competition increases, higher values of p maximize the bounds.
3. For the case of a bidder with a higher private value and one or more bidders that share a lower
private value, we show that the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique.
4. For that case, we show how to compute equilibrium revenue, and we explore how it depends
on p, the ratio of higher to lower private values, and the number of bidders. We show that
steeper weight functions are needed to maximize revenue as competition increases.
2 Bid Lower Bounds at an Equilibrium
In this section, we consider quasi-proportional auctions with weight functions f(x) = xp for p > 0.
For these auctions, we prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and we give lower
bounds for bids at an equilibrium. Mirrokni et al. [12] show there is a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium for 0 < p ≤ 1; we show that an equilibrium also exists for p > 1. When p > 1, a
bidder’s response function is not necessarily concave over the whole domain of their bids that give
nonnegative utility: [0, v], where v is the bidder’s private value. Thus, we cannot apply results
such as those by Rosen [17], as Mirrokni et al. do, to show the existence and uniqueness of a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Instead, we use Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem to prove existence
of an equilibrium.
First we show that each bidder’s best response is unique for all p > 0. Next we derive vectors
of lower bounds, w ∈ <+n, such that if all bidders i bid bi ≥ wi, where wi is the ith component of
w, then the same holds for the vector of bidders’ best responses to each others’ bids. We combine
that result with Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem to prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium. Since the bids at equilibrium are at least as great as the lower bounds w, the lower
bounds on bids also imply lower bounds for the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue.
In this section, we use b to represent a single bidder’s bid and b to represent the vector of
bidder’s bids; we drop the (b) notation that indicates functions of b, for example writing u instead
of u(b) for a bidder’s response function, and we use apostrophes to denote derivatives with respect
to b, such as f ′′ for the second derivative of the weight function.
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2.1 Uniqueness of the Best Response
To show that each bidder’s best response is unique, we will show that each bidder’s response curve
(their utility curve given other bidders’ bids) is concave at all points that have derivative zero.
Since the response curves are continuous, this implies there are no local minima. If there were
multiple local maxima, there would have to be a local minimum between each successive pair of
local maxima. So there can only be a single global maximum. (There is a maximum since the
response curve is zero and ascending at zero bid, zero and descending at bid equal to the bidder’s
private value, and the response curve and its first derivative are continuous. So we can apply
Bolzano’s theorem to the derivative.)
We will use b to represent a single bidder’s bid. Holding the other bidders’ bids fixed, the
allocation is
a =
f
f + s
, (3)
where s is the sum of weight functions of the other bidders’ bids. The bidder’s utility function is
u = a(v − b), (4)
where v is the bidder’s private value. We have the following theorem:
Theorem 1. If f = bp such that p > 0, and s > 0, then (u′ = 0)⇒ (u′′ < 0).
Please refer to the appendix for the proof.
Figure 1 shows the utility function and its first two derivatives for p = 1, p = 2, and p = 4.
In each case, we set s, the sum of weight functions for other bids, to 7, and the bidder’s private
value to 10. In Figure 1(a), with p = 1, the utility function is concave (negative second derivative)
over the whole bid domain [0,10]. In Figures 1(b) and 1(c), the utility functions are not concave
at b = 0, but the second derivatives are negative at the b values where the first derivatives are
zero. In Figure 1(a), the utility function is a smoothly rounded curve. In Figure 1(b), the utility
function is still somewhat rounded, but there is a slight S-curve starting at zero, and the curve is
less rounded and more linear to the right of the maximum. In Figure 1(c) these effects are more
pronounced. The S-curve that makes the utility functions in Figures 1(b) and 1(c) non-concave
on the left results from slow gains in allocation near bid zero, followed by quick gains due to the
growth of f = bp for large p, then by leveling off in the allocation as bp comes to dominate the
denominator in a = b
p
bp+s .
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Fig. 1. Utility Functions and Derivatives for p = 1, 2, 4
2.2 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria and Bid Lower Bounds
Let b = (b1, . . . , bn) be a vector of bids, with bi the bid for bidder i. Let BRi(b) be bidder i’s best
response to the other bidders’ bids. Define response function BR(b) = (BR1(b), . . . ,BRn(b)). Let
vi be the valuation for bidder i, and let f be the weight function. We have the following theorem:
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Theorem 2. Suppose f = bp for p > 0, and a vector w meets the conditions
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : wi ≤ vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)
si
)
, (5)
where si =
∑
j 6=i f(wj). Then, for all b such that ∀i : bi ≥ wi, ∀i : BRi(b) ≥ wi.
In other words, if w meets the conditions of the theorem, then BR maps [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn]
into itself. Please refer to the appendix for the proof.
Before we use this theorem to prove existence of an equilibrium and derive lower bounds for
bids at an equilibrium, look at Inequality 5. The value of p mediates a tradeoff. From the term
1
p , the bound gets stronger (closer to v) as p increases. However, for the bidder with the greatest
private value, increasing p can increase the weight function of that bidder’s bid, f , so much that
it dominates the sum of weight functions of other bidders’ bids, s, and this effect becomes more
pronounced as the ratio between the highest private value and other private values increases. So
we can get stronger bounds by using higher p if there is enough competition to keep fs low.
Using Theorem 2, it is straightforward to prove that there exist pure-strategy Nash equilibria
for quasi-proportional auction mechanisms with convex weight functions.
Theorem 3. For any bounds w that meet the conditions of Theorem 2, there exists a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn].
Proof. Note that the best response function BR is a continuous function of b over [w1, v1]× . . .×
[wn, vn]. Theorem 2 implies that BR maps [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn] into itself. Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem [1, 5] states that every continuous function from a convex compact set into itself has a
fixed point. Therefore,
∃b∗ ∈ [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn] : BR(b∗) = b∗. (6)
We now present some lower bound w’s satisfying Inequality 5. The following corollary gives
lower bounds that are the same for all bidders.
Corollary 1. Let vmin = min(v1, . . . , vn). Then Theorem 2 applies to lower bounds
∀i : wi = vmin
1 + 1p (1 +
1
n−1 )
. (7)
Proof. We will show that the condition of Theorem 2,
vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)
si
)
≥ wi,
holds. Since w1 = . . . = wn for these bounds, ∀i : f(wi) = sin−1 . So
∀i : vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)
si
)
=
vi
1 + 1p (1 +
1
n−1 )
≥ vmin
1 + 1p (1 +
1
n−1 )
= wi.
Note that when v1 = v2 = . . . = vn, and p = 1, then Corollary 1 gives a lower bound
v1
2+ 1n−1
,
which is v1/3 when n = 2 and approaches to v1/2 as n → ∞. Moreover, for any n, this lower
bound approaches v1 as p→∞.
Corollary 2 offers bounds based on the second-highest valuation. These bounds are stronger
than those from Corollary 1 when the second-highest valuation is significantly higher than the
minimum valuation.
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Corollary 2. Assume, without loss of generality, v1 ≥ . . . ≥ vn. Let w1 = w2 = v21+ 2p . For i > 2,
let
wi = min(
vi
1 + 1p (1 +
1
i−1 )
, wi−1). (8)
For these w values, the response function BR maps [w1, v1]× . . .× [wn, vn] into itself.
Proof. We will show that these bounds meet the condition from Theorem 2. For each i, we need
to show
vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)
si
)
≥ wi.
For i = 1:
v1
1 + 1p (1 +
f(w1)
s1
)
≥ v1
1 + 1p (1 +
f(w1)
f(w2)
)
=
v1
1 + 2p
≥ v2
1 + 2p
= w1.
For i = 2:
v2
1 + 1p (1 +
f(w2)
s2
)
≥ v2
1 + 1p (1 +
f(w2)
f(w1)
)
=
v2
1 + 2p
= w2.
For i > 2:
vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)
si
)
≥ vi
1 + 1p (1 +
f(wi)∑i−1
j=1 f(wj)
)
≥ vi
1 + 1p (1 +
1
i−1 )
≥ wi.
In general, there are many w ∈ <+n satisfying Inequality 5, and each of them corresponds to
a different lower bound. These bounds provide some insight on how the auctioneer’s revenue at
the best pure-strategy equilibrium varies with p and n.
3 Symmetric Competition Against a High-Value Bidder
In this section, we consider a special case, where there is one bidder with a higher private value,
and the other bidders have lower private values that are equal to each other. Without loss of
generality, we assume that bidder 1 has valuation v1 = α > 1, and bidders 2, . . . , n have valuations
v2 = . . . = vn = 1. We call this case OLOS (one larger, others symmetric). The case of two bidders
is a special case of OLOS. We use OLOS to gain insight about how p, the ratio α between the
highest valuation and lower valuations, and the number of bidders n affect revenue when a single
bidder with a high private value competes against a set of bidders with lower private values.
Having a single large bidder is particularly interesting since it yields a low equilibrium revenue
in a second-price auction. Specifically, for OLOS, the equilibrium revenue of the second-price
auction is 1, for any α > 1 and n ≥ 2. This is very unsatisfactory when α or n is large. Intuitively,
we expect that higher α should lead to higher equilibrium revenue, and more bidders (larger n)
should spur more fierce competition, which should also increase the equilibrium revenue. In this
section, we show by analysis and computational studies that we can adaptively design quasi-
proportional auctions (i.e. adaptively choose exponent p for each (n, α)) to achieve equilibrium
revenues significantly larger than 1, and strictly increasing in both α and n.
As we will show in this section, the assumption of symmetric small bidders can significantly
simplify the analysis. Specifically, this assumption allows us to (1) prove the uniqueness of the
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium and (2) compute the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue efficiently.
We believe that, in practice, this assumption is not as restrictive as it seems: many practical cases
in which there is one large bidder and many similar small bidders are well approximated by OLOS.
This section proceeds as follows: first, we show that for any choice of α > 1, n ≥ 2, and p > 0,
there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for OLOS. Second, we discuss how to efficiently
compute the auctioneer’s revenue at this unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and provide
upper and lower bounds on it. Finally, we discuss how to design the optimal quasi-proportional
auction for each (n, α), and how R∗(n, α) and p∗(n, α) vary with n and α, where R∗(n, α) is the
highest equilibrium revenue achieved by the quasi-proportional auctions for (n, α), and p∗(n, α) is
the exponent achieving this highest equilibrium revenue.
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3.1 Uniqueness of the Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
We first prove that there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for OLOS. The following
lemma shows that in such cases, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium must have symmetric bids
among all the small bidders.
Lemma 1. Assume that b∗ is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, then we have
b∗2 = b
∗
3 = . . . = b
∗
n.
(Please refer to the appendix for the proof.) Thus, to characterize b∗, we only need to specify b∗1
and b∗2. To simplify the exposition, in the remainder of this section, we sometimes use b1 and b2
to respectively denote b∗1 and b
∗
2, and define z = b1/b2. Note that from the first-order condition
for the best response, we have
(n− 1)bp2 [αp− (1 + p)b1] = bp+11
[bp1 + (n− 2)bp2] [p− (1 + p)b2] = bp+12 (9)
Notice that the above equations imply that b1 <
p
1+pα and b2 <
p
1+p . Dividing the first equation
by the second equation1, we have
n− 1
zp + n− 2
αp− (1 + p)zb2
p− (1 + p)b2 = z
p+1. (10)
Solving the above equation, we have
b2 =
p
1 + p
α− w
z − w , where w = z
p+1 z
p + n− 2
n− 1 . (11)
Substituting the above equation into the first equation of Equation 9, we have
(n− 1)
[
α− w − α
w − z z
]
=
zp+1
1 + p
w − α
w − z ,
which implies that
w =
αzp+1
zp+1 + (1 + p)(n− 1)(z − α) .
Combining the above equation with Equation 11, we have
zp + n− 2
n− 1 =
α
zp+1 + (1 + p)(n− 1)(z − α) ,
which is
h(z)
∆
= z2p+1 + [(n− 2) + (1 + p)(n− 1)] zp+1 − α(1 + p)(n− 1)zp
+ (n− 1)(n− 2)(1 + p)z − α(n− 1) [(1 + p)(n− 2) + 1] = 0, (12)
where h(z) is a shorthand notation for the lefthand side of the above equation. The following
lemma states that Equation 12 has no root in
[
0, α
1
1+2p
]⋃
[α,∞).
Lemma 2. h(z) > 0 for all z ≥ α, and h(z) < 0 for all z ∈
[
0, α
1
1+2p
]
.
Please refer to the appendix for the proof of Lemma 2. The following lemma states that Equation
12 has a unique solution in <+, whose proof is also available in the appendix.
Lemma 3. The equation h(z) = 0 has a unique solution z˜ ∈ <+. Moreover, z˜ ∈
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
.
1 It is straightforward to prove that at a Nash equilibrium, b1 > 0 and b2 > 0, so the division is well-
defined.
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Putting together all the results in this section, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4. For OLOS, there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium b∗. Moreover:
1. This equilibrium is symmetric among all the small bidders in the sense that b∗2 = b
∗
3 = . . . = b
∗
n.
2. At this equilibrium, α
1
1+2p < b∗1/b
∗
2 < α and
p
1+p+ 1n−1
≤ b∗2 < p1+p .
Proof. The symmetry among the small bidders follows from Lemma 1. From Lemma 3, equation
h(z) = 0 has a unique solution in
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
. Hence, z = b∗1/b
∗
2 is uniquely determined and
α
1
1+2p < b∗1/b
∗
2 < α. From Equation 11, once z is uniquely determined, b
∗
2 and b
∗
1 = zb
∗
2 are
also uniquely determined. Thus, there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium b∗. Finally,
b∗2 <
p
1+p follows from Equation 9, and b
∗
2 ≥ p1+p+ 1n−1 follows from Corollary 1.
3.2 Auctioneer’s Equilibrium Revenue
We now characterize the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue. Notice that
R =
bp1
bp1 + (n− 1)bp2
b1 +
(n− 1)bp2
bp1 + (n− 1)bp2
b2
=
zp
zp + (n− 1)zb2 +
(n− 1)
zp + (n− 1)b2
=
zp+1 + n− 1
zp + n− 1 b2.
From Equation 11, we have
R =
p
1 + p
[
1 +
zp(z − 1)
zp + (n− 1)
] [
1− (α− z)(n− 1)
z2p+1 + (n− 2)zp+1 − z(n− 1)
]
, (13)
where z is the unique solution of Equation 12. Thus, we can efficiently compute the auctioneer’s
equilibrium revenue as follows:
1. Compute z by (numerically) solving Equation 12.
2. Compute the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue R by Equation 13.
Since OLOS and the quasi-proportional mechanism are fully characterized by the triple (n, α, p),
sometimes we write R as R(n, α, p) to emphasize this dependence. It is straightforward to derive
the following bounds on R(n, α, p):
Corollary 3. For any (n, α, p), we have R(n, α, p) < p1+p
[
1 + α
p(α−1)
αp+(n−1)
]
and
R(n, α, p) >
p
1 + p
1 + α
p
2p+1
(
α
1
2p+1 − 1
)
α
p
2p+1 + (n− 1)
[1− (α− α 12p+1 )(n− 1)
α+ (n− 2)α p+12p+1 − (n− 1)α 12p+1
]
.
Proof. Define
η(x) =
p
1 + p
[
1 +
xp(x− 1)
xp + (n− 1)
] [
1− (α− x)(n− 1)
x2p+1 + (n− 2)xp+1 − x(n− 1)
]
,
it is straightforward to show that η(x) is strictly increasing in x over interval
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
. This
corollary follows from the facts that (1) R(n, α, p) = η(z), and (2) z ∈
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
.
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3.3 Revenue-Maximizing Mechanism Design
Now we discuss how to design a quasi-proportional auction mechanism (i.e. how to choose the
exponent p) to maximize the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue for OLOS. Notice that for a given
(n, α), this mechanism design problem is a one-dimensional optimization problem. Moreover, as
we have discussed above, for a given triple (n, α, p), the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue R(n, α, p)
can be efficiently computed. Consequently, this mechanism design problem can be efficiently solved
by line search. We present some computational analysis of R(n, α, p), followed by some theorems
about how n, α, and p influence equilibrium revenue.
In Figure 2, we plot R(n, α, p) versus p for some given (n, α)’s. Notice that the value of p that
maximizes revenue increases as α decreases and as n increases. In other words, as competition
increases, steeper weight functions are needed to maximize revenue. Also notice that for all the
considered (n, α)’s, there exists p such that R(n, α, p) > 1, the equilibrium revenue of the second-
price auction. Moreover, for all the considered (n, α)’s, the equilibrium revenue R first increases
with p, and then decreases with p. So there is a unique revenue-maximizing p (quasi-proportional
mechanism).
In Figure 3, we plot R(n, α, p) versus α for some given (n, p)’s. We observe that R is an
increasing function of α for all the considered (n, p)’s, which is reasonable since a higher private
value for the large bidder will lead to a higher equilibrium revenue, for a fixed number of small
bidders and value p.
In Figure 4, we plot R(n, α, p) versus n for some (α, p) values. Notice that Figures 4(a) and 4(b)
show that for a fixed (α, p), the equilibrium revenue R first increases with n and then decreases with
n. As more small bidders are added, their equilibrium bids increase due to increased competition.
For fixed α and p, this can have two conflicting effects: initially, the increased bids increase the
equilibrium revenue, but as more small bidders are added, the small bidders win more of the
allocation, reducing the portion bought by the single high-value bidder at a higher bid. This
decreases revenue. This revenue reduction can be alleviated by adapting p to (n, α), that is,
choosing the revenue-maximizing p based on (n, α). We will discuss this later in this section.
We also notice that the initial interval where R increases as a function of n depends on (α, p).
Figures 4(c) and 4(d) show that if α or p is large, R is monotonically increasing for n ≤ 600.
We are interested in the highest equilibrium revenue achieved by the quasi-proportional mech-
anisms, and which quasi-proportional mechanism achieves the highest revenue. Thus, we define
R∗(n, α) = max
p>0
R(n, α, p) and p∗(n, α) = arg max
p>0
R(n, α, p). (14)
Figure 5 shows how R∗(n, α) and p∗(n, α) vary with α and n. Specifically, Figures 5(a) and 5(c)
show that for a given n, R∗ is a strictly increasing function of α. That is, the auctioneer’s highest
equilibrium revenue increases with the large bidder’s private value. Moreover, it is interesting to
observe that R∗ is almost an affine function of α, and different n’s corresponds to different slopes.
Figures 5(b) and 5(d) show that for a given n, p∗ is a strictly decreasing function of α. Moreover,
the decrease rate (the negative of the first derivative) decreases as α increases. Note that p∗ > 1
when α is small, which implies that the revenue-maximizing weight function is convex. We also
observe that p∗ is primarily determined by α: for a fixed α and very different n’s (e.g. 2 and 500),
the variation of p∗ is small.
Figure 5(e) shows that for a given α, R∗ is a strictly increasing function of n. That is, more small
bidders will increase the auctioneer’s equilibrium revenue. We also observe that as n increases,
R∗(n+ 1, α)−R∗(n, α) decreases. That is, each additional small bidder makes a smaller marginal
contribution to the auctioneer’s highest equilibrium revenue. Figure 5(f) shows that for a given α,
p∗ first decreases with n and then increases with n. Similar to Figures 5(b) and 5(d), Figure 5(f)
demonstrates that for a given α, the variation of p∗ with n is relatively small, which implies the
robustness of p∗ (mechanism design) to the mis-specification of parameter n.
Recall that for OLOS, the equilibrium revenue from a second-price auction is always 1. The
following theorem states that for any (n, α), the equilibrium revenue will diminish as p ↓ 0, while
the equilibrium revenue will be at least as much as that of the second-price auction as p→∞.
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium Revenue R(n, α, p) vs. p
Theorem 5. For any n ≥ 2 and α > 1, we have
lim
p↓0
R(n, α, p) = 0 and lim inf
p→∞ R(n, α, p) ≥ 1.
Proof. Notice that R(n, α, p) < p1+p
[
1 + α
p(α−1)
αp+(n−1)
]
from Corollary 3, thus
lim
p↓0
R(n, α, p) ≤ lim
p↓0
p
1 + p
[
1 +
αp(α− 1)
αp + (n− 1)
]
= 0.
Hence, we have limp↓0R(n, α, p) = 0. Moreover, from Theorem 4, p1+p+ 1n−1
≤ b∗2 < p1+p . Thus,
limp→∞ b∗2 = 1. Moreover, since b
∗
1 > α
1
2p+1 b∗2 > b
∗
2, we have lim infp→∞ b
∗
1 ≥ limp→∞ b∗2 = 1.
Hence we have lim infp→∞R(n, α, p) ≥ 1.
The following theorem shows that there does not exist a p (i.e. a quasi-proportional mechanism
with f(x) = xp) such that for all (n, α), R(n, α, p) > 1 (i.e. has an equilibrium revenue higher
than the second-price auction). In other words, to achieve an equilibrium revenue higher than
the second-price auction, we have to choose different quasi-proportional auction mechanisms for
different (n, α)’s.
Theorem 6. For any (n, p)
lim sup
α↓1
R(n, α, p) ≤ p
1 + p
,
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium Revenue R(n, α, p) vs. α
and for any (α, p)
lim sup
n→∞
R(n, α, p) ≤ p
1 + p
.
Proof. Notice that from Corollary 3, R(n, α, p) < p1+p
[
1 + α
p(α−1)
αp+(n−1)
]
. Thus we have
lim sup
α↓1
R(n, α, p) ≤ lim
α↓1
p
1 + p
[
1 +
αp(α− 1)
αp + (n− 1)
]
=
p
1 + p
,
and
lim sup
n→∞
R(n, α, p) ≤ lim
n→∞
p
1 + p
[
1 +
αp(α− 1)
αp + (n− 1)
]
=
p
1 + p
.
4 Discussion
This paper focuses on revenue-maximizing mechanism design for quasi-proportional auctions.
Specifically, for the general n bidder case, we have proved the existence of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium and given lower bounds for bids at an equilibrium. For the OLOS case, we have also
(1) proved the uniqueness of the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and (2) developed an approach
to efficiently compute the equilibrium revenue. We have also presented how to numerically solve
the revenue-maximizing mechanism design problem in the OLOS case. We used computation to
show that steeper weight functions maximize revenue when there is more competition, and we
used analysis to show the importance of selecting p based on α and, to a lesser extent, on n.
In practice, the auctioneer does not know the precise value of α (and perhaps n). However,
the auctioneer may know that (with high probability), (α, n) lies in a some subset D of (1,∞)×
{2, 3, . . .}. Since p∗ is robust to small changes in both α and n (see Figure 5), if D is “small”, then
we can choose p based on any (α, n) ∈ D. If D is “large”, then we can choose an exponent p˜ by
robust optimization:
p˜ ∈ arg max
p:p>0
min
(α,n)∈D
R(n, α, p). (15)
Since there are only three decision variables, this (non-convex) optimization problem can be solved
numerically.
One challenge for further research is to prove that there is a unique pure-strategy Nash equi-
librium for p > 1. Another challenge is to produce a closed-form solution for equilibrium bids,
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium Revenue R(n, α, p) vs. n
based on bidders’ private values. Analyzing equilibria for other weight functions, such as expo-
nentials, would be an interesting way to extend this work. (Use f(x) = ex − 1 to avoid awarding
an allocation for a bid of zero.)
It would also be interesting to explore strategies for the auctioneer’s selections of p over repeated
auctions. In a model where bidders need some allocation in order to learn their private values, the
auctioneer may benefit from starting with a lower p value to have more of an even allocation as
bidders learn, then increasing p from auction to auction. As the bidders learn their private values,
the auctioneer may gain information about the bidders’ private values from their evolving bids. It
would also be interesting to explore optimal settings for p in a model where auctioneers compete
against each other for bidders.
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Appendices
A Proofs
A.1 Proof for Theorem 1
We will first prove a lemma about allocations and their derivatives, apply it to prove a lemma
about weight functions, then apply that lemma to our weight functions.
Lemma 4. If aa′′ < 2(a′)2, then (u′ = 0)⇒ (u′′ < 0).
Proof (of Lemma 4). Since
u′ = a′(v − b)− a, (16)
u′ = 0 implies a′ 6= 0 (otherwise a = 0 also holds and aa′′ = 2(a′)2) and
v − b = a
a′
. (17)
Since
u′′ = a′′(v − b)− 2a′, (18)
combining with Equation 17, we have
u′′ =
aa′′
a′
− 2a′ = 1
a′
[
aa′′ − 2(a′)2] . (19)
Since a′ > 0 and aa′′ < 2(a′)2, we have u′′ < 0.
Lemma 5. If ff ′′ < 2(f ′)2, then (u′ = 0)⇒ (u′′ < 0).
Proof (of Lemma 5). Note that
a =
f
f + s
, (20)
a′ =
f ′s
(f + s)2
, (21)
and
a′′ =
s[f ′′(f + s)− 2(f ′)2]
(f + s)3
. (22)
Substitute into aa′′ < 2(a′)2 from Lemma 4 and multiply by s(f + s)4:
f2f ′′ + ff ′′s− 2f(f ′)2 < 2(f ′)2s. (23)
f2f ′′ + ff ′′s < 2f(f ′)2 + 2(f ′)2s. (24)
ff ′′(f + s) < 2(f ′)2(f + s). (25)
ff ′′ < 2(f ′)2. (26)
Proof (of Theorem 1). Note that
f = bp, f ′ = pbp−1, and f ′′ = p(p− 1)bp−2. (27)
Substitute into ff ′′ < 2(f ′)2 from Lemma 5:
bpp(p− 1)bp−2 < 2(pbp−1)2. (28)
p(p− 1)b2p−2 < 2p2b2p−2. (29)
p(p− 1) < 2p2. (30)
This holds for p > 0.
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A.2 Proof for Theorem 2
Proof. Consider any bidder i. To simplify the exposition, we drop the subscripts i while we focus
on that single bidder. Let u be their utility function and w be their lower bound wi. Let s be the
sum of the weight function over other bidders’ bids:
s =
∑
j 6=i
f(bj), (31)
and assume bids are at least their lower bounds: ∀j 6= i : bj ≥ wj . Recall from Theorem 1 that the
utility function u has a single local maximum, so u′ ≥ 0 at b = w implies that the best response
is at least w. At b = w,
u′ = a′(v − w)− a. (32)
So
v − w ≥ a/a′ (33)
implies u′ ≥ 0 at b = w. Substitute
a =
f
f + s
and a′ =
f ′s
(f + s)2
: (34)
v − w ≥ f(f + s)
2
(f + s)f ′s
. (35)
Cancel f + s and do some algebra:
w ≤ v − f
f ′
(1 +
f
s
). (36)
Substitute f = wp and f ′ = pwp−1:
w ≤ v − w
p
(1 +
f
s
). (37)
Solve for w:
w ≤ v
1 + 1p (1 +
f
s )
. (38)
A.3 Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. Similarly as the previous section, we define s∗i =
∑
j 6=i f(b
∗
j ). From the first-order condition
at a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we have2
f(b∗i ) [f(b
∗
i ) + s
∗
i ]
f ′(b∗i )s
∗
i [vi − b∗i ]
= 1 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (39)
Notice that f(b∗i ) + s
∗
i is a constant for all i. Thus, for f(x) = x
p and any i, j ≥ 2, we have
b∗i
s∗i [1−b∗i ]
=
b∗j
s∗j [1−b∗j ]
. Let m =
∑
k 6=i,j f(b
∗
k), we have s
∗
i = m+ (b
∗
j )
p and s∗j = m+ (b
∗
i )
p, hence we
have
b∗i [m+ (b
∗
i )
p]
[1− b∗i ]
=
b∗j
[
m+ (b∗j )
p
][
1− b∗j
] .
Notice that 0 < b∗i , b
∗
j < 1, thus, to prove b
∗
i = b
∗
j , it is sufficient to prove that function g(x) =
x[m+xp]
1−x is strictly monotone in interval (0, 1), for any m and p, notice that
g′(x) =
1
(1− x)2 [m+ x
p + pxp(1− x)] > 0.
Hence b∗i = b
∗
j and we have proved the lemma.
2 Notice that the results in the previous section indicate the denominator is bounded away from 0.
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A.4 Proof for Lemma 2
Proof. Notice that when z ≥ α. we have
(1 + p)(n− 1)zp+1 ≥ α(1 + p)(n− 1)zp
and
(n− 1)(n− 2)(1 + p)z ≥ (1 + p)(n− 2)(n− 1)α.
Thus, h(z) ≥ z2p+1 + (n − 2)zp+1 − α(n − 1). Since z ≥ α > 1 and p > 0, we have zp > 1 and
z2p+1 > zp+1 > z ≥ α. Thus, h(z) > 0.
Similarly, when z ≤ α 11+2p , we have
(1 + p)(n− 1)zp+1 < α(1 + p)(n− 1)zp
and
(n− 1)(n− 2)(1 + p)z ≤ (1 + p)(n− 2)(n− 1)α.
Thus, h(z) < z2p+1 + (n− 2)zp+1 − α(n− 1). Since z ≤ α 11+2p and p > 0, we have z1+2p ≤ α and
z1+p ≤ α 1+p1+2p < α. Thus, h(z) < 0.
A.5 Proof for Lemma 3
Proof. Notice that from Lemma 2, the equation h(z) = 0 has no solution in interval
(
0, α
1
2p+1
]
and interval [α,∞). Moreover, since function h(z) is continuous, h
(
α
1
1+2p
)
< 0, and h(α) > 0,
equation h(z) = 0 has at least one solution in the interval
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
.
Note that to prove the uniqueness of the solution in the interval
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
, it is sufficient to
prove that h′(z) > 0 when h(z) ≥ 0. That is, to prove that h(z) is strictly increasing when it is
nonnegative. To simplify the exposition, we write h(z) as
h(z) = z2p+1 + c1z
p+1 − c2zp + c3z − c4,
where c1 = (n − 2) + (1 + p)(n − 1), c2 = α(1 + p)(n − 1), c3 = (n − 1)(n − 2)(1 + p), and
c4 = α(n − 1) [(1 + p)(n− 2) + 1] (see Equation 12). Notice that c1, c2, c4 > 0, and c3 ≥ 0 (note
c3 = 0 when n = 2). Hence we have
h′(z) = (2p+ 1)z2p + (p+ 1)c1zp − pc2zp−1 + c3.
The first observation is that in interval
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
, we always have
c3z − c4 < (n− 1)(n− 2)(1 + p)α− α(n− 1) [(1 + p)(n− 2) + 1] = −α(n− 1) < 0.
Thus, h(z) ≥ 0 implies that
z2p+1 + c1z
p+1 − c2zp > α(n− 1) > 0,
which leads to
pz2p + pc1z
p − pc2zp−1 > αp(n− 1)/z > p(n− 1) > 0,
where the second inequality follows from z < α. Thus we have
h′(z) = (2p+ 1)z2p + (p+ 1)c1zp− pc2zp−1 + c3 > pz2p + pc1zp− pc2zp−1 + c3 > p(n− 1) + c3 > 0.
Thus, in interval
(
α
1
2p+1 , α
)
, h′(z) > 0 when h(z) ≥ 0.
